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Abstract 
This paper explores the role of a number of factors in explaining the heterogeneity in the 
degree of price stickiness across industries, on the basis of the information provided by 
surveys on pricing behavior conducted in nine euro area countries. The main focus is 
placed on the influence of competition on the degree of price flexibility. Our results 
suggest that the price setting strategies of the most competitive firms give them a 
greater capacity to react to shocks and make, in practice, for greater flexibility in their 
prices. The direct influence of market competition on price flexibility is corroborated by a 
cross-country cross-industry econometric analysis based on the information provided 
by surveys. This analysis also shows that the cost structure and demand conditions 
help to explain the degree of price flexibility. Finally, it suggests that countries in which 
product market regulation is more relevant are characterized by less price flexibility.  
Keywords: price setting, competition, survey data. 
JEL Codes: D40, E31. 
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1 Introduction 
A crucial factor determining firms’ pricing behavior is the degree of market competition. Since 
early studies on price stickiness using micro data, the relationship between market structure 
and pricing behavior has been a highly researched issue in industrial economics.1 
In particular, a great deal of attention has been devoted to the question of whether firms in 
competitive markets are more likely to change prices in response to shocks than firms 
enjoying significant market power [see for instance Ginsburgh and Michel (1988) and 
Martin (1993)]. Moreover, firms in more competitive industries, facing higher uncertainty about 
their future position in the market, may be more concerned with ensuring short-run returns, 
which leads to a higher responsiveness to current shocks [Encaoua and Geroski (1986)]. 
By contrast, firms facing less competition can place more emphasis on long-term returns and 
adopt pricing policies that smooth out expected fluctuations in costs and demand.2 
Oligopolists may prefer delays in adjusting prices in order to avoid breaking tacit pricing 
understandings [Stiglitz (1984)]. 
 There are also a number of empirical papers linking price stickiness and degree 
of market competition. For instance, Carlton (1986) and Hall et al. (2000) find that firms in 
competitive markets tend to adjust prices faster than companies facing a less elastic demand. 
Geroski (1992) shows that price responses to both supply and demand shocks are faster 
in more competitive industries. Similarly, Weiss (1995) finds that cost changes are more 
fully transmitted into prices in industries with low concentration ratios. Overall, the empirical 
evidence tends to favor the existence of a positive link between price flexibility and the 
degree of competition [see Dixon (1983); Encaoua and Geroski (1986), and Bedrossian and 
Moschos (1988)], although there are also studies reporting the opposite result. For instance, 
Domberger (1979) finds a positive relationship between the speed of price adjustment and 
market concentration. He rationalizes this result by arguing that prices should react faster to 
costs shocks in concentrated industries, given that information is more easily gathered the 
higher the degree of concentration.3 
 More recently, renewed attention has been placed on the empirical relevance of the 
relationship between the degree of price stickiness and the intensity of market competition. 
For instance, the existence of a positive association between the frequency of price change 
and the degree of competition has been documented on the basis of individual producer 
prices for Spain and Belgium [see Álvarez et al. (2005) and Cornille and Dossche (2006), 
respectively] and for Luxembourg using consumer prices [Lünnemann and Mathä (2005)]. 
Furthermore, the qualitative information in the surveys on price setting behavior discussed in 
this book has provided an alternative source to assess the empirical significance of this 
relationship, which has been analyzed in several countries (see section 3 below). 
                                                                          
1. See Mills (1927) and Means (1936) for early contributions on the behavior of individual prices, and Silberston (1970) 
and Carlton (1989) for surveys of theoretical and empirical work on the relationship between pricing behavior and market 
structure. 
2. A similar argument is considered by Eichner (1973). Industries characterized by increasing returns to scale usually lead 
to a small number of competitors that carry out the necessary large irreversible investments. The pricing policies of these 
firms are more oriented by long-run objectives than by short-run costs or demand fluctuations. 
3. This argument is consistent with Stigler’s (1964) model, according to which the fewer the number of firms in an 
industry the easier it is to monitor price cuts. Identifying price cuts with slow adjustment to cost increases, it can be 
argued that the fewer the number of firms, the faster the adjustment to cost shocks. 
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 In this paper, we analyze the relationship between price flexibility and 
competition, focusing on euro area manufacturing and services industries. The distinguishing 
features of our study are the consideration of the whole euro area, the use of survey data 
and the inclusion of services sectors, which are generally neglected in this type of 
analysis. After this introduction, the structure of the remainder of this paper is the 
following: section 2 discusses the measurement of the degree of market competition in 
surveys. Section 3 explores the main features of firms pricing strategies according to their 
competitive environment. Section 4 shows some evidence on the relationship between 
competition and the degree of price flexibility. Our econometric results on the determinants of 
price flexibility in the euro area and presented in section 5, while section 6 concludes. 
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2 Measuring the degree of market competition 
Measuring the degree of market competition is an extremely complex task that has received a 
lot of attention in the literature on industrial organization [see, for instance, Bresnahan (1989)]. 
In the context of the surveys on price setting discussed in this book, most national 
questionnaires included two questions directly related to the degree of competition faced by 
firms. Specifically, companies were asked to report on their market share and on the number 
of competitors. Unfortunately, these two measures have considerable shortcomings. First, 
both are highly subjective in the sense that different firms may use different criteria to define 
relevant markets or to identify their potential competitors. Second, in some oligopolistic 
markets with a small number of big companies enjoying large market shares, there is a very 
high degree of competition (e.g. telecommunications). Third, some industries may have a 
large number of competitors, but still maintain local market power (e.g. bars and restaurants). 
 For this reason, we infer the degree of competition faced by a firm from the 
importance it attaches to changes in competitors’ prices in explaining its own price 
decreases. The rationale for this choice is that it can be expected that the more competitive is 
the environment faced by a firm, the more its pricing strategy is likely to be affected by the 
behavior of its competitors. Interestingly, the Dutch survey [Hoeberichts and Stokman (2006)], 
which is the only one including a direct question on the degree of perceived competition, 
comes in with results that support the use of this measure to proxy market competition. The 
importance attached by firms to changes in competitors’ prices turns out to be highly 
correlated with the directly reported degree of perceived competition. This measure has the 
additional advantage that it is available for all countries. An additional measure that we use in 
the empirical analysis is the share of firms that set prices using a markup rule. We expect this 
share to be negatively related to the degree of market competition. Unfortunately, this 
information is not available for Austria and Luxembourg. 
 If we measure intense competition by considering those firms that report that 
competitors’ prices are important or very important in determining a reduction in their own 
prices, it turns out that around 60% of firms in the euro area face intense competition 
(see Table 1). This share ranges from 54% in Spain to 71% in the Netherlands, although it has 
to be borne in mind that these cross-country differences are affected by differences in the 
sectoral coverage of national surveys.4 
                                                                          
4. For instance, the degree of perceived competition in Spain is found to be lowest in energy (31%), energy trade (38%), 
and bars and restaurants (44%). At the other end of the spectrum, the share of firms facing intense competitive 
pressures is highest in communications (69%), hotels and travel agents (66%) and food trade (65%). 
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TABLE 1 
Degree of perceived competitiona (percentagesb)  
Country Very low Low High Very high 
Austria 20.2 18.2 30.3 31.3 
Belgium 17.6 21.8 30.4 30.1 
France 19.5 17.3 38.4 24.9 
Germany 19.0 23.4 34.0 23.6 
Italy 9.8 24.6 37.0 28.5 
Luxembourg 15.3 17.2 36.7 30.7 
The Netherlands 4.6 24.6 48.8 22.0 
Portugal 8.5 21.1 38.6 31.9 
Spain 26.6 19.2 24.0 30.2 
Euro Areac 17.1 21.5 35.2 26.2 
 
Source: authors’ calculations based on national data. 
a Measured by the importance a firm attaches to competitors’ prices when considering 
reducing its own prices. 
b Rescaled figures excluding non responses. 
c Weighted average (GDP weights). 
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3 Competition and firms’ price setting strategies 
As discussed in the introduction, the degree of market competition is an important factor in 
determining price setting behavior. In particular, it is reasonable to expect that firms facing a 
higher degree of competition will employ more flexible price determination strategies, which 
give them a greater ability to react to changes in market conditions. 
 In this section we use the results of the national surveys to analyze differences in 
firms’ price setting policies, according to the intensity of market competition. Specifically, 
we focus on the differences in some aspects of pricing strategies, such as the use of markup 
rules versus other policies, time versus state dependence, forward looking behavior, and 
frequency of price reviews, in terms of the degree of competition faced by firms. 
 The various questionnaires address the issue of how firms set prices using slightly 
different formulations. Nevertheless, the results of the national surveys, with the exception of 
those for Austria and Luxembourg, can be compared by grouping the answers into three 
alternatives: “markup over costs”, “price set according to competitors’ prices” and “other” 
[see Fabiani et al. (2006)]. Overall, the evidence, summarized in Table 2, shows that a 
significant share of firms (54%) set their prices as a markup over marginal costs, suggesting 
that they enjoy a non-negligible degree of market power. The fraction of companies setting 
prices according to those of their competitors is 27%. Finally, around 19% of the companies 
state that they do not have autonomous price setting policies. For these firms, the final 
decision on the price charged is taken by a different economic agent, and this may be the 
public sector, the parent company, the main customers or the suppliers. 
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TABLE 2 
Price setting policies by degree of perceived competitiona (percentagesb) 
Country Markup 
Competitors’ 
price 
Other 
Belgium    
   All firms 45.9 36.4 17.7 
   Low competition - - - 
   High competition - - - 
France    
   All firms 40.0 38.0 22.0 
   Low competition 49.8 24.4 25.9 
   High competition 36.0 47.6 16.4 
Germany    
   All firms 73.0 17.0 10.0 
   Low competition 78.9 9.4 11.7 
   High competition 69.8 22.5 7.6 
Italy    
   All firms 42.4 31.7 25.9 
   Low competition 57.6 14.5 27.9 
   High competition 33.6 42.6 23.7 
The Netherlands    
   All firms 56.4 22.3 21.3 
   Low competition 56.6 15.3 28.2 
   High competition 56.5 25.4 18.1 
Portugal    
   All firms 64.5 12.6 22.9 
   Low competition 78.7 2.9 18.4 
   High competition 59.9 17.6 22.4 
Spain    
   All firms 51.9 26.6 21.5 
   Low competition 61.3 11.8 27.0 
   High competition 44.1 40.5 15.3 
Euro Areac    
   All firms 54.3 27.1 18.7 
   Low competition 63.6 14.7 21.7 
   High competition 49.8 35.1 15.1 
Source: authors’ calculations based on national data. 
a Measured by the importance a firm attaches to competitors’ prices when considering 
reducing its own prices. 
b Rescaled figures excluding non responses. 
c Weighted average (GDP weights). 
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 There are interesting differences in these figures with respect to the degree 
of perceived competition. In particular, we find that the fraction of firms using markup 
rules is higher among those operating in low competition environments: 64% as compared 
to 50% among firms facing intense competition. This result is qualitatively similar for all 
countries. In turn, only 15% of euro area firms operating in low competitive markets set prices 
taking into account competitors’ prices, whereas 35% of them do so if they face strong 
competition. This pattern of results also holds for all countries. 
 State dependent rules may lead to more flexible prices than time dependent ones in 
the face of shocks; hence, we check whether pure state dependent rules are more frequent 
among competitive firms. The evidence in favour of this hypothesis is rather weak: the fraction 
of euro area firms using pure state dependent rules is 27% among firms facing intense 
competition and 25% for firms operating in low competition environments. 
 The use of forward looking strategies can also be expected to be more widespread 
in competitive environments. Evidence for Spain shows that price revisions among highly 
competitive firms do not usually involve the application of simple rules, but are the result of an 
optimizing process in which expectations as to how market conditions may change are, fairly 
frequently, taken into account. The fraction of forward looking price setters is 37% among 
firms operating in a competitive environment and 18% for companies facing low competition. 
Furthermore, the Spanish survey also shows that firms operating in competitive environments 
use active commercial policies to a greater extent. 
 There are also differences concerning the frequency of price reviews. As expected, 
firms operating in more competitive environments review their prices more frequently 
(Figure 1). For the euro area as a whole, the fraction of firms reporting that competitors’ prices 
are unimportant (very important) and reviewing prices at least twelve times per year is 23% 
(34%). Conversely, the share of companies reviewing prices at most three times per year is 
68% (45%) for firms reporting that competitors’ prices are unimportant (very important) on 
their pricing decisions. This positive relationship between the frequency of price reviews and 
the intensity of competition is observed in all countries. 
 
FIGURE 1 
Frequency of price reviews by degree of perceived competitiona 
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Source: authors’ calculations based on national data. 
a Measured by the importance a firm attaches to competitors’ prices when considering 
reducing its own prices. 
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4 Competition and the degree of price flexibility 
4.1 Descriptive statistics 
A first approach to explore the relationship between competition and price stickiness consists 
in measuring the frequency of price adjustment for different groups of firms defined in terms 
of the degree of competition they face. As Figure 2 shows, firms facing stronger competitive 
pressures display a higher frequency of price adjustment. For the euro area as a whole, the 
share of companies changing prices at least four times a year is 10% (26%) for firms reporting 
that competitors’ prices are unimportant (very important) in their pricing decisions. 
Conversely, the fraction of firms changing prices at most once a year is 73% (50%) for firms 
indicating that competitors’ prices are unimportant (very important) in price setting. This 
pattern of results is observed in all countries with the exception of Austria. 
 Table 3 reports the average implicit duration as obtained from interval grouped 
figures for the frequency of price changes for the different countries and degrees 
of competition.5 For the euro area, prices remain unchanged on average for the most 
competitive firms for 9 months, while in more sheltered markets prices are maintained 
for 14 months. As can be seen from the Table, the relationship between the degree of 
perceived competition and the average price duration is negative and monotonic in most 
countries. 
FIGURE 2 
Frequency of price changes by degree of perceived competitiona 
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Source: authors’ calculations based on national data. 
a Measured by the importance a firm attaches to competitors’ prices when considering 
reducing its own prices. 
                                                                          
5. To obtain these implicit durations, the following assumptions have been made: for firms declaring “at least four price 
changes per year” a duration of 1.33 months (i.e. 8 price changes per year) has been considered; for those declaring 
“two or three changes per year” a duration of 4.8 months (i.e. 2.5 price changes per year); for those declaring “one 
change per year” a duration of 12 months; and, finally, for those declaring “less than one price change per year”, a 
duration of 24 months. 
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 TABLE 3 
Average implicit price duration (in monthsa) by degree of perceived 
competition  
Country Degree of perceived competitionb 
 Very low Low High Very high 
Austria 10.0 9.4 9.9 10.5 
Belgium 12.7 11.9 12.0 10.8 
France 14.0 11.7 11.3 7.9 
Germany 15.9 12.2 14.1 11.4 
Italy 12.7 13.1 11.8 7.6 
Luxembourg 10.5 9.3 9.1 6.4 
The Netherlands 10.6 11.9 10.5 9.2 
Portugal 13.3 13.0 12.2 11.6 
Spain 13.1 11.3 11.0 9.4 
Euro Areac 13.8 12.0 12.1 9.4 
Source: authors’ calculations based on national data. 
a  To obtain these implicit durations, the following assumptions have been made: for 
firms declaring “at least four price changes per year” it has been assumed a duration 
of 1.33 months (i.e., 8 price changes per year); for those declaring “two or three changes 
per year” a duration of 4.8 months (i.e., 2.5 price changes per year) has been considered; 
for those declaring “one change per year” a duration of 12 months has been considered; and, 
finally, for those declaring “less than one price change per year”, a duration of 24 months has 
been assumed. 
b Measured by the importance a firm attaches to competitors’ prices when considering 
reducing its own prices. 
c  Weighted average (GDP weights). 
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4.2 Country specific results 
The link between the prevailing competitive environment and the degree of price flexibility has 
been explored in the different country specific studies, using a variety of methodological 
approaches. Some studies have analyzed the influence of the degree of market competition 
on the reported frequency of price changes. In particular, Hoeberichts and Stokman (2006). 
find a positive impact from the perceived degree of competition on the frequency of price 
adjustment, using an ordered logit model. In a similar vein, Álvarez and Hernando (2005) 
report a positive effect of the intensity of competition on the frequency of price changes, in a 
log linear regression model. In both cases, the estimated models control for other potential 
determinants of price flexibility. In turn, Aucremanne and Druant (2005) in a bivariate analysis 
finds that flexible firms –i.e. firms with shorter average duration between two consecutive 
price changes– tend to experience more competition, as proxied by different indicators such 
as the number of competitors or the importance of competitors’ prices to explain price 
changes. 
 The influence of the intensity of competition on the probability of price adjustments 
after shocks has been addressed for a larger number of countries using probit models. 
The reaction to positive and negative demand as well as costs shocks has been 
considered. The general conclusion that arises from these country specific studies is that the 
speed of response to demand shocks is significantly higher for those firms operating in 
more competitive environments. In this type of analysis, the dependent variable is a binary 
variable that is set to 1 if the firm declares that it changes its price (within a specific period or 
without any time constraint) after the shock and 0 otherwise. In turn, the intensity of 
competition is proxied by the importance attached by companies to their competitors’ prices, 
although there are country specific differences as well.6 Table 4 reports the sign of the 
estimated impact in the available country studies. Overall, results show that prices are more 
flexible in response to demand shocks the higher the degree of market competition. This 
finding holds across countries and independently of the direction of the shocks, although it is 
not significant for Portugal and, in the case of contractionary shocks, for Spain. These results 
suggest that a slow price reaction to demand contraction in a highly competitive sector may 
result in a substantial loss of market share. In contrast, the speed of adjustment to costs 
shocks does not seem to be significantly affected by the degree of competition. 
                                                                          
6. The precise definitions used in the different countries both for the binary dependent variable and for the proxies of 
competition can be found in the country specific studies. 
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TABLE 4 
Impact of market competition on the probability of adjustment after shocks 
(main results from probit analysis)a,b 
Country Type of shock 
 
Increase in 
demand 
Fall in 
demand 
Increase 
in costs  
Fall in 
costs 
Austria + + no no 
France + + + no 
Italy + + - - 
Portugal no no no no 
Spain + no no no 
 
Source: authors’ calculations based on national data. 
a  “+” denotes that competition is positively and significantly related to the probability of a 
price increase/decrease in response to an increase/decrease in demand/costs; “-” denotes 
that competition is negatively and significantly related to the probability of a price 
increase/decrease in response to an increase/decrease in demand/costs; “no” denotes that 
competition is not significantly related to the probability of a price increase/decrease in 
response to an increase/decrease in demand/costs. 
b  The definition of the dependent variable in the probit analysis as well as of the competition 
variable may be found in the country specific studies. 
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5 Determinants of price flexibility in the euro area 
In this section, we explore the potential role of a number of factors to explain differences in 
the degree of price flexibility across euro area industries. We focus on the competitive 
environment, the cost structure of the different industries, demand conditions and product 
market regulations.  
5.1 Data 
We have put together a database using sectoral information from national surveys. Our 
starting point is the consideration of all NACE 2 digit sectors, where we can broadly 
distinguish three groups of industries in terms of national coverage.7 First, manufacturing, 
which is covered in all country surveys; second, some market services (trade, hotels and 
restaurants, and transport and communications), which are covered in at least two big 
and two small euro area countries8; and third, the remaining sectors. Our full sample does not 
include this last group of sectors, since coverage in terms of countries is too limited to be 
considered informative for a euro area analysis.9 
 There are specific industries in some countries in which only a limited number of 
firms were surveyed. To ensure that our results are not driven by these observations, we also 
consider restricted samples made up of those sectors in which there are at least ten surveyed 
firms in a given country.10 We refer to these samples as high representativity samples. 
 The variables considered in our econometric models are mostly derived from the 
country surveys. That way the different variables refer to the same set of firms. To enhance 
the degree of comparability across countries, we employ the same definitions of variables as 
in Fabiani et al (2006). The main variables we use are the following: 
 Price flexibility - For the full set of countries, we have information on the number 
of price changes per year.11 Specifically, for each country and industry we know the 
fractions of firms that change prices considering four different categories: 1) at least four 
price changes per year; 2) two or three price changes per year; 3) one price change per year; 
and 4) less than one price change. We use the fraction of firms that change prices at least 
four times a year as the dependent variable in the econometric analysis. 
 Perceived competition - One measure of competition is obtained from the 
importance firms attribute to competitors’ prices in influencing a reduction in their own 
prices. Information refers to a mean score of the following categories: “1=unimportant”, “2=of 
minor importance”, “3=important” and “4=very important”. 
                                                                          
7. Available data for the Netherlands correspond to the aggregate of manufacturing and 5 different services groupings. 
For Belgium, we have information on 17 aggregates that group NACE sectors. 
8. These industries are covered in the Italian and Spanish surveys. 
9. Specifically, we cover the NACE 2-digit sectors coded 15, 17-22, 24-36, 51-60, 64. The remaining sectors do not 
satisfy the two big countries and two small countries minimum coverage rule. The exclusion of the sector “Coke and 
refined petroleum” is due to its markedly different pricing behavior. 
10. Given its special characteristics we have not applied the ten firms minimum for the sector “Office machinery and 
computers” (NACE 30). 
11. Specifically, five national surveys (for Belgium, Spain, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Austria) refer to the average 
number of price changes per year in recent years, whereas three (for Italy, France and Portugal) refer to the number of 
price changes in a precise year. For Germany, the figures we use refer to the number of price changes, as reported by 
the same firms in the IFO business survey in 2003, given that the German questionnaire did not include a question on 
the number of price changes. 
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 Markup - An alternative measure of competition for all countries, except Austria and 
Luxembourg, can be obtained from questions on price setting. In particular, we use the 
percentage of firms that declare employing markup over costs rules. 
 Labor costs, raw materials costs and demand - All national surveys included 
questions about the factors that are important for changing prices upwards or downwards, 
including labor costs, raw material costs and demand conditions. Respondents were asked 
to assign scores between “1=completely unimportant” and “4=very important” to each of 
them. In our analysis we consider, for each factor, the sum of scores for price increases and 
decreases. 
 Product market regulation - We employ both objective and subjective measures of 
regulation.12 For the former, which involve coding a variety of features of different laws and 
combining them into a single index, we use the estimates provided by Nicoletti et al. (1999). 
For the subjective measures, which involve coding responses to public opinion surveys of 
experts or of business people in which respondents are asked about the existence and 
impact of various regulations, we use the estimates by Pryor (2002). In both cases, measures 
refer to regulations at the national level, as information at the industry level is not available. 
 Sectoral dummies - We also consider dummies for groupings of manufacturing 
sectors (food, other consumer goods, intermediate products, and capital goods) and 
services sectors (trade, hotels and restaurants, and transport and communications). 
5.2 Econometric methodology 
In our analysis, we model the fraction of firms (freq) that change prices frequently. Given that 
fractions are bounded between 0 and 1 and linear predictors can take any real value, linear 
models are inappropriate in this setting and the alternative of using a log-odds ratio model 
also has potential problems. First, the method is not valid if the fraction takes on the values 0 
or 1, as it is sometimes the case in our sample. Second, further assumptions are needed 
to recover the conditional expectation. To avoid these problems we use the quasi-maximum 
likelihood (QML) approach of Papke and Woolridge (1996), involving the estimation of a 
nonlinear model. Specifically, the observed frequency is expressed as a bounded nonlinear 
function (typically a cumulative distribution function) of explanatory variables (x), and a 
Bernoulli likelihood function is maximized. The corresponding estimator is consistent and 
asymptotically normal. In our estimates we use a logistic cumulative distribution function.13 
That is, we estimate 
∑+
∑+
+= ii
ii
x
x
e
efreq βα
βα
1  freq ~ Bernoulli 
5.3 Results 
In this section first we report the results for basic specifications in which we measure the 
degree of market competition by the importance attached by firms to competitors’ prices 
in explaining their own price cuts and do not include any product market regulation 
variable. Second, we alternatively proxy competition by the variable markup. Finally, we 
estimate specifications including product market regulation variables. Throughout we present 
                                                                          
12. See Nicoletti and Pryor (2006) for a comparative study of several quantitative indicators of regulation in OECD 
nations. 
13. In our robustness analyses we have also considered a standard normal cdf and a cloglog. Results are not affected 
by the specific function used. 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 22 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 0629 
results for the full sample of manufacturing and services and also for manufacturing sectors 
only, since these data refer to all countries. In all cases, we check for robustness using high 
representativity samples, where only those industries in which at least ten firms are surveyed 
in a given country are considered. 
 The first column in Table 5 reports estimates for the complete set of manufacturing 
and services industries. As can be seen, price flexibility-as measured by the fraction of firms 
that change prices at least four times a year –is significantly and positively affected by the 
degree of market competition. Regarding the variables proxying the cost structure, we expect 
that those sectors where labor costs are highly relevant tend to contain a relatively small 
fraction of firms that change prices often. This is explained by the fact that wage changes 
typically take place once a year. On the other hand, those sectors where raw materials are 
highly relevant can be expected to show a high degree of price flexibility, since raw material 
prices change very often. In this specification, we estimate a negative coefficient on labor and 
a positive one on raw materials, although they are not significant. We also find a positive and 
significant effect of the demand variable, showing that in those sectors where demand 
conditions are important there is a high degree of price flexibility. Regarding country dummies, 
we find positive and significant coefficients for Austria, Germany and Luxembourg. This is 
interesting since Austria and Germany are two countries where product market regulation is 
low.14 Finally, the transport and communications sector is found to be significantly less flexible 
than the other sectors.15 The second column in Table 5 restricts the sample to highly 
representative industries. The only difference with respect to the whole sample is that cost 
variables are now highly significant, although the demand variable is no longer significant. 
Considering only manufacturing industries (column 3), competition, cost structure and 
demand variables are all significant, with the exception of the labor variable, which is only 
correctly signed. Finally, restricting the manufacturing sample to highly representative sectors, 
we find that competition and cost variables are highly significant, although this is no longer the 
case for the demand variable. 
                                                                          
14. No information for Luxembourg is available. 
15. According to the results from country specific studies (see, for instance, Álvarez and Hernando (2005), this result is 
most likely driven by the high stickiness of pricing policies of transport firms. 
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TABLE 5 
Determinants of price flexibilitya,b (perceived competition specifications) 
Explanatory variablesc Manufacturing and services Manufacturing 
 Full sample
High 
representativity 
sample 
Full sample 
High 
representativity 
sample 
Perceived competition  0.69**  0.88***  0.85**  0.91*** 
Labor -0.11 -0.56*** -0.18 -0.59*** 
Raw materials  0.22  0.27**  0.30*  0.32** 
Demand  0.35*  0.25  0.34*  0.24 
Austria  2.75***  2.61***  3.06***  2.76*** 
Belgium  0.23 -0.1  0.54  0.13 
France  0.54 -0.39  0.58 -0.4 
Germany  1.52***  0.70**  1.55***  0.67** 
Italy  0.53  0.45  0.56  0.37 
Luxembourgd  1.07**  1.57***  0.99 - 
The Netherlands   0.64  0.43 - - 
Spain  0.45 -0.16  0.4 -0.3 
Consumer non food goods -0.47 -0.2 -0.45 -0.19 
Intermediate goods -0.17 -0.21 -0.19 -0.22 
Capital goods -0.56 -0.38 -0.55 -0.39 
Trade  0.66  0.28 - - 
Hotels and restaurants -0.32 -0.25 - - 
Transport and communications -1.08** -1.18*** - - 
Constant -6.68*** -4.38*** -7.26*** -4.53*** 
Number of obs.  162  133  137  113 
Pseudo R squared  0.48  0.40  0.47  0.41 
Log likelihood -49.61 -39.78 -42.19 -33.83 
AIC  137.22  117.56  114.39  95.65 
BIC  195.89  172.47  158.19  133.84 
 
Source: authors’ calculations. 
a  Dependent variable: fraction of firms that change prices at least four times a year. 
b  p-values: *=p<.1; **=p<.05; ***=p<.01. Computed using Huber-White robust standard 
errors. 
c  Definition of explanatory variables: see the main text. The reference industry is Food in 
Portugal. 
d  The Luxembourg survey does not include any manufacturing industry in which more than 
ten firms were surveyed. An alternative measure of competition is obtained using the 
percentage of firms that employ markup rules. The main disadvantage of this measure is that 
it is not available for Austria and Luxembourg. Column 1 of Table 6 reports the results for the 
full sample. It is found that competition, costs and demand variables are all significant. This 
result also holds for the smaller sample of highly representative industries (column 2). 
Considering only manufacturing firms does not change results (column 3) and these are also 
robust to the use of the high representative sample (column 4). 
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TABLE 6 
Determinants of price flexibilitya,b (markup specification excluding product 
market regulation) 
Explanatory variablesc Manufacturing and services Manufacturing 
 Full sample
High 
representativity 
sample 
Full sample 
High 
representativity 
sample 
Markup -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.02** 
Labor -0.33* -0.39** -0.42** -0.47** 
Raw materials  0.37**  0.41***  0.45***  0.48*** 
Demand  0.32*  0.52***  0.32*  0.47*** 
Belgium -0.11 -0.15  0.04  0.16 
France -0.32 -0.27 -0.47 -0.33 
Germany  1.13***  1.00**  1.05**  0.86** 
Italy -0.27 -0.56 -0.33 -0.87* 
The Netherlands   0.83*  0.38 - - 
Spain -0.01 -0.12 -0.27 -0.28 
Consumer non food goods -0.83** -0.76** -0.75** -0.72** 
Intermediate goods -0.47 -0.64** -0.48 -0.63** 
Capital goods -0.85** -0.85** -0.81** -0.79** 
Trade -0.19  0.26 - - 
Hotels and restaurants -0.79* -0.57 - - 
Transport and communications -1.45*** -1.62*** - - 
Constant -2.6 -3.50** -2.41 -3.41** 
Number of obs.  122  108  104  93 
Pseudo R squared  0.36  0.33  0.40  0.33 
Log likelihood -31.42 -27.46 -26.43 -23.46 
AIC  96.84  88.92  78.87  72.92 
BIC  144.51  134.51  113.24  105.84 
 
Source: authors’ calculations. 
a  Dependent variable: fraction of firms that change prices at least four times per year. 
b  p values: *=p<.1; **=p<.05; ***=p<.01. Computed using Huber-White robust standard 
errors. 
c  Definition of explanatory variables: see the main text. The reference industry is Food in 
Portugal. Table 7 considers the addition of either objective or subjective measures of product 
market regulation to the specifications in Table 6. Column 1 includes the objective measure of 
Nicoletti et al. (1999) for the whole sample of manufacturing and services industries. It is 
found that competition, cost structure and demand variables are highly significant. Moreover, 
those countries in which product market regulation is more important display a lower degree 
of price flexibility. Column 2 reports results using the subjective measure by Pryor (2002) and 
shows that the results are robust to the change in the regulation variable. As an additional 
check, we consider just manufacturing sectors. The relevance of competition, cost structure 
and demand variables are again found, regardless of the use of an objective (column 3) or 
subjective (column 4) measure of product market regulation. 
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TABLE 7 
Determinants of price flexibilitya,b (markup specification including product market 
regulation) 
Explanatory variablesc Manufacturing and services Manufacturing 
 
Objective 
 regulationd  
Subjective 
 regulatione 
Objective 
 regulationd
Subjective 
 regulatione 
Markup -0.02** -0.02*** -0.02** -0.02*** 
Labor -0.45*** -0.37*** -0.51*** -0.37*** 
Raw materials  0.40***  0.41***  0.48**  0.43** 
Demand  0.32**  0.33**  0.32*  0.35** 
Product markets regulation -2.51*** -2.45*** -2.48*** -2.79*** 
Consumer non food goods -0.75** -0.81** -0.72** -0.81** 
Intermediate goods -0.45 -0.48* -0.46* -0.51* 
Capital goods -0.76** -0.82** -0.73** -0.85** 
Trade -0.17 -0.34 - - 
Hotels and restaurants -0.79* -1.14*** - - 
Transport and communications -1.39*** -1.52*** - - 
Constant -0.49 -1.03 -0.64 -0.85 
Number of obs.  122  122  104  104 
Pseudo R squared  0.30  0.34  0.31  0.35 
Log likelihood -31.96 -31.64 -27.06 -26.73 
AIC  87.92  87.28  72.11  71.45 
BIC  121.57  120.93  95.91  95.25 
Source: authors’ calculations. 
a  Dependent variable: fraction of firms that change prices at least four times a year. 
b  p values: *=p<.1; **=p<.05; ***=p<.01. Computed using Huber-White robust standard errors. 
c  Definition of explanatory variables: see the main text. The reference industry is Food in Portugal. 
d  Objective product market regulation variable. Source: Nicoletti et al. (1999). 
e  Subjective product market regulation variable. Source: Pryor (2002). 
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6 Conclusions 
Recent empirical studies on price setting behavior using micro data have shown a marked 
heterogeneity in the degree of price stickiness across industries. In this paper, we have 
explored the role of a number of factors in explaining this heterogeneity, on the basis of 
the information provided by surveys on pricing behavior conducted in nine euro area 
countries. The main focus has been placed on the influence of the intensity of competition on 
the degree of price flexibility. Our results suggest that the pricing policies of firms operating in 
more competitive environments show greater flexibility in certain aspects. These firms carry 
out price revisions and changes substantially more often and tend to use markup rules to a 
lesser extent. Overall, the price setting strategies of the most competitive firms give them 
a greater capacity to react to shocks and make, in practice, for greater flexibility in their 
prices. 
 The direct influence of market competition on price flexibility is corroborated by a 
cross-country cross-industry econometric analysis based on the information provided by the 
surveys. This analysis also shows that the cost structure and demand conditions help to 
explain the degree of price flexibility. Finally, it suggests that countries in which product 
market regulation is more relevant are characterized by less price flexibility. Overall, these 
results are in line with the micro quantitative evidence on the determinants of the frequency of 
consumer and producer price changes [Sabbatini et al. (2006)]. 
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